Britain was supposed to have left the EU in March 2019. The dire deal negotiated over the previous two years continues to linger even after being rejected by Parliament three times. A planned fourth attempt was aborted, ending Theresa May’s premiership in the process. Here, Leave.EU recounts the outgoing prime minister’s dreadful negotiations with Brussels.
Theresa May, having triggered EU withdrawal in March 2017, vowing to take Britain out of the bloc two years later with either a good deal or no deal at all, proceeded to immediately hand Brussels the advantage.
The EU was allowed to set the negotiating schedule: withdrawal and the future relationship would not be negotiated side by side, but sequentially with Brussels putting a break on talks until the prime minister agreed to cough up £39bn of taxpayers’ money.
May capitulated in the Autumn of that year with a pledge of £20bn at a speech in Florence. The massive sum was casually doubled in December in exchange for a 21-month transition period, starting on Brexit day in March 2019 – since delayed to October, by which point May will have left Downing Street.
Concessions over citizens rights were then made, along with a commitment to avoid border infrastructure in Ireland at all costs, a decision that would cast a shadow over the whole process. The EU secured additional concessions in the run-up to the March 2018 European Council summit when it was revealed British fisheries would remain under Brussels’ control during the transition period, threatening their very existence.
The joint UK-EU pledge to avoid infrastructure in Ireland has proved even more disastrous than initially feared. May’s half-baked “Chequers plan” for Britain to take back control of its trade policy while remaining in the EU Customs Union was unceremoniously binned by EU leaders at a summit in Vienna in September 2018. She then agreed to remain in the Customs Union indefinitely.
The process of exiting the EU outlined in the 599-page Withdrawal Agreement could last forever as Brussels continually rebuffs British proposals for a high-tech, open, but regulated border in Ireland designed to replace the infamous backstop. In the miraculous event, the EU agrees to break the backstop a new free trade agreement would take its place, the terms of which are sketched out by a non-binding political declaration. A customs arrangement is a core objective, killing any prospect of a trade deal with the United States, Britain’s biggest commercial partner. Indeed, Britain would have no independent authority to strike trade deals.
May’s concession-ridden dealings with the EU could have the reverse effect. Time and again, Brussels has said it’s the deal or No Deal. EU leaders will probably allow another extension, but the can-kicking cannot go on forever. Given how unpalatable the withdrawal treaty is to MPs who voted it down three times, there remains a strong possibility Britain will regain full sovereignty by leaving the bloc without terms, trading under the framework of the World Trade Organisation. We live in hope.
A BREAKDOWN OF THE OPTIONS
1. THE UK NEGOTIATES A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (FTA) WITH THE EU
The most relaxed of the formal options available to the UK is a typical free trade deal. Britain would retain full or partial access to the Single Market, meaning tariffs on the vast majority of goods would continue to be exempted. But there would be no requirement for the UK to adopt regulations from Brussels, nor would Free Movement be a pre-requisite.
2. THE UK REMAINS PART OF THE CUSTOMS UNION
The Customs Union in many ways mirrors the the EEA. Just as all EU countries are in the EEA, they are also members of the CU. Non-EU countries in the Customs Union are usually hoping to one day become fully-fledged EU Member States, whereas the likes of EEA Norway have decided not to join the EU but have sought a higher level of EU market access. Non-EU countries in the customs union include Turkey, free movement is not a pre-requisite as it is with the EEA. The EU wants to retain access to the UK labour market and has not entertained the CU option in public.
The Customs Union carries a major drawback. Members must adopt the EU’s common tariffs (aka import duties) and regulations. In other words, members of the CU cannot unilaterally raise or lower tariffs on any imports other than agricultural goods, and as a result, they cannot enter into trade agreements without the EU doing so first. EEA countries can.
The Customs Union in many ways mirrors the the EEA. Just as all EU countries are in the EEA, they are also members of the CU. Non-EU countries in the Customs Union are usually hoping to one day become fully-fledged EU Member States, whereas the likes of EEA Norway have decided not to join the EU but have sought a higher level of EU market access. Non-EU countries in the customs union include Turkey, free movement is not a pre-requisite as it is with the EEA. The EU wants to retain access to the UK labour market and has not entertained the CU option in public.
The Customs Union carries a major drawback. Members must adopt the EU’s common tariffs (aka import duties) and regulations. In other words, members of the CU cannot unilaterally raise or lower tariffs on any imports other than agricultural goods, and as a result, they cannot enter into trade agreements without the EU doing so first. EEA countries can.
3. THE UK REMAINS A MEMBER OF THE EEA
Under this option, Britain would still remain within the European Economic Area (EEA), which comprises of all the EU Member States plus three other countries, Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein. The EEA is essentially, the EU’s Internal Market, minus agriculture and fisheries. A ‘Norway-Style’ relationship therefore means the European Court of Justice will no longer be Britain’s supreme court, EU VAT requirements will no longer apply, agriculture and fisheries policies will be back under the government’s control, as will its ability to independently negotiate trade deals. A condition of remaining in the single market however is to adopt Free Movement, pay budget contributions to the EU, albeit at a significantly reduced level, and adhere to the EU’s single market regulations.
4. THE UK NEGOTIATES ITS OWN EEA TYPE DEAL
Switzerland chose to arrange its own EEA-type deal with the EU. It has tariff-free access to the single market, but whereas Norway and the other EEA countries have chosen to weld most of their industries to the EU’s single market, Switzerland has opted to be more selective, adhering to the Free Movement in principle, but on occasion restricting access to its labour market.
At the other end of the spectrum, MPs in Westminster have hatched a plan known as “Common Market 2.0” or EEA+ to keep Britain in both the Single Market and the Customs Union, with agricultural products included – the EEA agreement includes farming and fisheries, but they are largely outside of the EU’s internal market. EEA+ therefore encompasses almost all aspects of European integration, but without political representation. It is universally recognised as the worst of all options, even less attractive than remaining in the EU.
5. THE CHEQUERS CUSTOMS FUDGE
The option no-one foresaw. Only Whitehall, where the fudge was hatched, says it can work, most likely spin to soften the blow of remaining in the Customs Union (see option 2). The prime minister’s December 2017 pledge to not install border infrastructure in Ireland signalled a horrible compromise would be in the offing. No sovereign border in the world is controlled without the presence of infrastructure (cameras, barriers, checkpoints). Discounting these facilities consigns Britain to the CU.
Following the December withdrawal agreement, The British government had to think up a third way to avoid what is known as the “Irish Backstop” – namely staying in the Customs Union. Under the so-called “Chequers proposal” the UK is supposed to remain part of the EU’s external frontier but act as a de facto sovereign trading nation by collecting tariffs on behalf of Brussels for EU-bound shipments. Exporters of goods destined for the UK market from nations with whom Britain has signed trade deals will receive a refund. All well and good if they enter the UK via a British port, but what about shipments routed through Antwerp, Hamburg and Rotterdam? The government is not pushing for the EU to record these imports and refund HM Treasury although it is compelled to do so thanks to an amendment forced onto the EU Withdrawal Bill by Tory Brexiteers led by Jacob Rees-Mogg. This sense of not knowing where anything stands is far from confined to the Rees-Mogg amendments, indeed it perfectly encapsulates the entire concept, which needless to say, is doomed.
The option no-one foresaw. Only Whitehall, where the fudge was hatched, says it can work, most likely spin to soften the blow of remaining in the Customs Union (see option 2). The prime minister’s December 2017 pledge to not install border infrastructure in Ireland signalled a horrible compromise would be in the offing. No sovereign border in the world is controlled without the presence of infrastructure (cameras, barriers, checkpoints). Discounting these facilities consigns Britain to the CU.
Following the December withdrawal agreement, The British government had to think up a third way to avoid what is known as the “Irish Backstop” – namely staying in the Customs Union. Under the so-called “Chequers proposal” the UK is supposed to remain part of the EU’s external frontier but act as a de facto sovereign trading nation by collecting tariffs on behalf of Brussels for EU-bound shipments. Exporters of goods destined for the UK market from nations with whom Britain has signed trade deals will receive a refund. All well and good if they enter the UK via a British port, but what about shipments routed through Antwerp, Hamburg and Rotterdam? The government is not pushing for the EU to record these imports and refund HM Treasury although it is compelled to do so thanks to an amendment forced onto the EU Withdrawal Bill by Tory Brexiteers led by Jacob Rees-Mogg. This sense of not knowing where anything stands is far from confined to the Rees-Mogg amendments, indeed it perfectly encapsulates the entire concept, which needless to say, is doomed.
6. THE UK TRADES WITH THE EU THROUGH WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO) RULES
Should negotiations break down with the European Union for whatever reason, the UK would fall back onto World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules in its commercial relationship with the EU. The core principle of WTO membership is to treat all other members equally and the EU will not be able to impose arbitrary and prohibitive duties on imports from the UK.
ARTICLE 50
Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (also known as the Lisbon Treaty) is central to the process of exiting the EU. The prime minister submitted Britain’s notification of withdrawal to the European Council on 29 March 2017. The negotiating period should have expired two years later, but following three failed attempts by Theresa May to get the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated with Brussels through the House of Commons, the timeline was extended to October 31.See next article below to learn more about the withdrawal process.
https://leave.eu/uk-eu-negotiations/
The Prime Minister promises to trigger Article 50 by the end of March. Here’s a breakdown of how the process will unfold.
The Prime Minister first gives formal notice of the United Kingdom’s intention to leave the EU. This marks the beginning of a two-year negotiating period between Britain and the remaining 27 EU Member States. Britain is therefore expected to leave the European Union in March of 2019 or at least set in place an agreement for the UK’s departure by then.
The negotiating period can be extended, provided each of the 27 remaining EU Member States as well as the United Kingdom agree.
It is important to note that until the Article 50 procedure is complete, the UK remains bound by the provisions of the EU Treaties, with all the rights, responsibilities, and obligations including full access to European markets.
The media has highlighted pressure from the EU leadership for Britain to activate Article 50 exit talks ‘as soon as possible,’ however the timing of Article 50’s activation is at the sole discretion of the United Kingdom.
Obstacles
The trigger date of Article 50 may be for the UK to decide, but who within the UK’s parliamentary system does so and under what terms is another matter. The Prime Minister may have set a deadline for invoking Article 50, but that does not mean she will get her way.
The Government’s lawyers have been defending a claim in the courts for Parliament to first give its approval before the executive – namely Mrs May and her cabinet – can go ahead and get negotiations under way. After losing its case in the High Court, the Government has made an appeal via the Supreme Court. The final ruling will be made in the New Year.
In preparation for a defeat in the courts, Theresa May has reportedly prepared an act of Parliament consisting of only three lines asking that the will of the people be honoured and for the Government to be given control over Article 50 proceedings. The opposition Labour Party has pledged to vote in the ruling Conservative’s favour. However, given the zeal with which so many Labour and Conservative MPs have argued for a Brexit so soft we would essentially remain in the EU, it is difficult to envisage the Government securing an entirely free hand over Article 50.
Meanwhile, Shadow Brexit Secretary, Sir Keir Starmer has tabled a motion asking for the Government to reveal its negotiating position before invoking Article 50. The motion is likely to be passed as more than twenty Conservative MP are reported to support it. And, even though the motion calls for “no disclosure of material that could be reasonably judged to damage the UK in any negotiations” it is near impossible to conceive of Parliament debating the plan without it compromising on our negotiating position with the EU.
Finally, The Commission’s chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier has proposed a three-tiered approach to the negotiations. He wants to address the UK’s outstanding EU commitments in the form of long-term projects and payments, alongside a transitional deal. Only after those two tiers are addressed should, in Mr Barnier’s view, the question of a replacement UK-EU arrangement be negotiated.
Barnier’s negotiating framework is clearly a ploy to eat up precious time and force the UK onto the back foot. No doubt, he is aware that under a law introduced by David Cameron’s government, any new law must be ratified by Parliament. If Britain’s longer-term trade relationship is to be arranged outside of the Article 50 negotiating period there is a serious danger that a largely pro-EU Parliament will vote it down, and then we will back to square one, and in all likelihood, still in the EU thanks to Mr Barnier’s much prized transitional arrangement, which Theresa May has herself, has also strongly hinted at.
